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One may distinguish between three broad conceptions of linguistic meaning. 
One conception, which I will call “logical”, views meaning as given in 
reference (for words) and truth (for sentences). Another conception, the 
“monological” one, seeks meaning in the cognitive capacities of the single 
mind. A third, “dialogical”, conception attributes meaning to interaction 
between individuals and personal perspectives. In this chapter I directly 
contrast how well these three approaches deal with the evidence brought 
forth by fictive interaction. I examine instances of fictive interaction and 
argue that intersubjectivity in these instances cannot be reduced to either 
referential-logical or individual-cognitive semantic notions. It follows that 
intersubjectivity must belong to the essence of linguistic meaning. 
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The conversation frame is a frame of intersubjectivity. In fictive interaction, 
the conversation frame, and thus intersubjectivity, emerges as the structure 
behind many linguistic and cognitive phenomena (Pascual 2002, 2006, 2014). 
                                                 
* Work for this chapter was supported by a Vidi research program 
(276.70.019, Principal Investigator: E. Pascual) from the Netherlands Organization 
for Scientific Research (NWO). I would like to thanks Esther Pascual and Karen 
Sullivan for many valuable comments on earlier drafts of the text. 
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Thus, when a business offers its potential customers a “Not happy? Money 
back! guarantee” (Pascual 2014, p. 65), a scenario is being set up, in which a 
buyer exhibits dissatisfaction, the seller asks her: “Not happy?”, she confirms, 
and, finally, the seller redresses her dissatisfaction by offering her money 
back. This entire conversation, only part of which is spelled out, modifies the 
noun “guarantee” and establishes a category, a kind of purchase arrangement 
(Pascual, Królak and Janssen 2013). Referring to this kind of guarantee and 
thinking of it thus involves intersubjectivity on the conceptual level. 
So what? Yes, people use language to communicate, but centuries of 
philosophical and linguistic tradition tell us that, at least when we consider 
the nature of linguistic meaning, intersubjectivity and communication do not 
come first. In this chapter, I offer an argument for the opposite view. I 
examine instances of fictive interaction and argue that intersubjectivity in 
these instances cannot be reduced to allegedly “simpler” semantic notions. It 
follows that intersubjectivity must belong to the essence of linguistic 
meaning. 
In making these claims, I will be applying a distinction between three 
different approaches to the nature of language and meaning. The distinction 
(made originally by Voloshinov 1986) is based on the number of people 
necessary for linguistic meaning to emerge. 
One view—I will call it the logical approach—seeks meaning in the 
words and sentences of a given expression in-and-of-themselves, belonging 
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to the abstract (logical) system of language. The minimum number of persons 
necessary for an expression to be meaningful on this view is zero. 
A second view—I will call it the monological approach—seeks 
meaning in the mind (or cognitive capacities or conceptualizations) of the 
individual human being. The minimum number of people necessary for an 
expression to be meaningful on this view is thus one. 
Finally, the third, dialogical approach seeks meaning in interaction 
between persons and sees language as structured through-and-through by 
such interaction. This approach requires a multiplicity of people (two or 
more) for an expression to be meaningful (and note that this is a multiplicity 
of individuals; an undifferentiated mass of “society” will not do). 
In what follows, I present logical and monological responses to the 
phenomenon of fictive interaction, and will argue, based on the evidence 
fictive interaction brings, for a consistently dialogical approach. 
1. The logical approach to language  
Let me begin with a quote from the first chapter of Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione (Barnes 1984, p. 25): 
 
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks 
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for 
all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs 
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of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections 
are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same […] Just as some 
thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one 
or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with 
combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for 
instance “man” or “white” when nothing further is added—are like the 
thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are 
neither true nor false. 
 
This passage offers us the earliest and most influential 
conceptualization of language, at least in Western culture (Arens 1984). It is 
a picture of language we all still easily recognize today: words signify 
concepts, which in turn stand for things in the world and their properties. If 
the word for a property is predicated of a word for an object that has this 
property, the result is a sentence expressing a true proposition. Absent such a 
match between words and reality, the proposition is false. The conditions for 
forming a sentence are defined by truth and falsity. 
Note that in this picture, meaning resides in words, their combination, 
and their connection with things. Human beings are part of the process 
(through the “affections of the soul”), but their role is entirely passive (these 
affections are copies of forms in the world, not shaped by the soul that bears 
them). Note also the role of logic (“truth and falsity”) in this account. 
Aristotle’s conceptualization of language gave us the grammar taught 
in grammar school, it gave us the units into which we break language down, 
it created the terrain on which millennia of philosophical and linguistic battles 
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on the word-concept-object axis were waged. More recently, the entire 
Fregean tradition in the philosophy of language (including formal semantics 
and indeed also Generativism in linguistics) can be seen as an extended 
elaboration on the theme of “falsity and truth have to do with combination 
and separation”. Aristotle’s picture is so deeply ingrained in the way we look 
at language that we’d be naïve to think, even today, that we have overcome 
it. 
And yet, for some decades now, we have seen evidence amass that 
shows this picture is deeply misleading. Central elements of it came under 
direct attack from cognitive linguists (e.g. Fauconnier 1990; Fauconnier and 
Turner 2002; Langacker 1987), functional linguists (e.g. Hopper 1998), 
discourse and conversation analysts and interactionists (e.g. Ochs, Schegloff, 
& Thompson 1996) and others. Unfortunately, space does not allow me to 
review this evidence and arguments based on it, but I do want to briefly 
examine one particular kind of critique. This critique, unlike others, received 
considerable attention from logically-minded linguists and philosophers (e.g., 
Gendler Szabó 2005), which also allows us to observe their strategy for 
responding to such challenges. To see the problem, consider the (constructed) 
sentences in (1), which are among the more frequently used examples in the 
relevant literature. 
 
(1) a. The stove is hot 




For both (1a) and (1b), the context in which they may be uttered 
affects the criteria for determining their truth or falsity. At a temperature of 
140°C, a stove would not be considered hot, and so (1a) would be false, if 
you plan to bake bread in it, but (1a) would be deemed true if you are 
wondering whether it is safe to touch the stove with your bare hands (Travis 
1996). And as for (1b), a literal interpretation should have assigned it the 
meaning that Liz has never had breakfast, even though any reasonable person 
would understand (1b) as stating Liz has had no breakfast on the day on which 
it was uttered. These examples show that we cannot exclude persons, with 
their rich understanding of the situations in which utterances are made, from 
an account of linguistic meaning, even if meaning is construed in the 
traditional logicist terms of truth conditions. 
To understand how “hardline” adherents of the logical approach 
respond to this critique, we should bear in mind that the Aristotelian 
conceptualization of language, as such, is viewed by these scholars not as a 
model to defend, but as a self-obvious ground for any discussion of language 
and semantics. They then defend their truth-based semantic theories from this 
self-evident ground. 
This is the basis for the sharp analytical distinction between semantics 
and pragmatics (and its close correlates, the distinctions between meaning and 
use and the literal and figurative), which forms the latest line of defense for 
formal and truth-based semantic theories against the onslaught of evidence 
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that appears to falsify them. The basic idea here is that the true meaning (or 
rather “semantic content”) of a sentence is given in its literal interpretation, 
arrived at by composing the literal meanings of the words making it up 
according to the sentence’s syntactic structure. This semantic content is then 
elaborated upon, mostly through drawing conversational implicatures (Grice 
1989) from it. 
It has long been acknowledged that the “semantic content” of a 
sentence need not form a complete proposition (Bach 1994), or make sense 
on its own (e.g., Cappelen and Lepore 2005), but its existence has been treated 
as if it were a self-evident, undeniable truth. That the semantic content of a 
sentence, thus determined, bears little or no relation to what we would 
normally take this sentence to mean is said to have no “significance for truth 
conditional semantics” (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, p. 47). Taking people’s 
actual use and understanding of language as a relevant starting point for 
discussing semantics is claimed to involve a “pragmatic fallacy” (Salmon 
1991). 
So, on this view, we can say (1a) is true if and only if the stove is hot, 
and this statement of the sentence’s truth conditions would be correct 
regardless of what exact temperature “hot” implies, and a semantic 
interpretation of (1b) would yield the statement that Liz has never eaten 
breakfast in her life. We can use (1b) to say Liz has not yet had breakfast 
today, but this is merely an implicature we draw from it (Bach 2005).  
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This line of defense works reasonably well with the sort of critiques 
cognitive linguists have levelled against logicist accounts of semantics (at 
least when evaluated on the logicists’ terms), and it may appear at first blush 
that the same strategy would apply to examples of fictive interaction too. 
Thus, if a speaker refers to dots that scream “Do something now about me” 
(example analyzed in Oakley and Coulson 2008), we can safely claim the 
semantic content of that speaker’s sentence has dots (in the literal sense) 
screaming (in the literal sense) the exact words “Do something now about 
me”, and whatever else one gathers from this sentence is already a matter of 
how it was used, of its pragmatics.1  
Alas, if we probe a bit further into the fictive interaction field, we will 
find a class of examples with which even this defense strategy fails. I 
specifically refer to direct speech compounds (Pascual, Królak, & Janssen 
2013; Pascual 2014, pp. 59–81), as seen in (2): 
 
(2) a. How are you? Fine. Relationships (Pascual 2014, p. 67) 
b. touch-your-nose-and-stand-on-one-foot,-are-you-drunk? test (p. 
63) 
c. “if only I had this or that […] then I’d be happy” attitude (p. 68) 
                                                 
1 Of course, dots cannot scream, but this is hardly a problem. The literally-
interpreted semantic content amounts to a patently false claim about screaming dots. 
This flouts Grice’s (1989) maxim of quality, at which point conversational 




addicts day (p. 70) 
 
These are all attested examples of actual linguistic usage, instantiating 
a widespread practice, but this fact is of little consequence in the eyes of 
logically-minded semanticists.2 Instead, these semanticists would surely 
notice that neither of the examples in (2) makes up a full sentence. But this 
can easily be fixed:  
 
(3) a. Stephen and Matilda have a “How are you? Fine.” relationship. 
b. The cop gave John the touch-your-nose-and-stand-on-one-foot,-
are-you-drunk? test. 
c. The “if only I had this or that then I’d be happy” attitude does not 
help you in life. 
d. Tomorrow is Make-your-kids-into-greedy-little-materialistic-
consumption-addicts day. 
 
Syntactically, the sentences in (3) can either be declared 
ungrammatical (and therefore, on the logical account, meaningless), or we 
                                                 
2 “Ordinary discourse often involves the use of complex expressions which 
would be counted as ungrammatical even by the utterer’s own lights […] It is absurd 
to suppose that we should count such discourse as grammatical, and thereby modify 
syntactic theory to account for it, and this despite its (statistically speaking) relative 
normalcy. It is just as absurd to suppose that our conception of semantics should be 
modified to account for every communicative action which involves the use of 
language” (Stanley 2000, p. 408). 
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can analyze the entire fictive utterance as a single constituent (Pascual 2006). 
The sentences in (3) appear to bear meaning, also in the narrow sense of 
having well-defined truth conditions. Thus, we can tell whether (3a) is true or 
false by observing whether or not Stephen and Matilda’s relationship indeed 
fits the description. So it would be difficult even for adherents of the logical 
approach to declare such sentences meaningless. 
However, if deemed meaningful, the sentences in (3) pose a serious 
problem for a logical approach. Each direct speech modifier in (3) contains 
within it at least one (fictive) utterance—and utterances come with all of their 
attendant pragmatics. We cannot correctly understand (3a) unless we identify 
“How are you? Fine” as a question-answer pair, and as an exchange of 
greetings. Moreover, the pragmatics in question is of the most unruly type 
(from the logicist perspective); it links not to the current context of utterance, 
but to the typical or fictive context of the embedded utterance: “I” in (3c) does 
not refer to the current speaker and “you” or “your” in (3a) and (3b) does not 
refer to the current addressee. 
The problem is that the methods, explained above, of separating 
pragmatics out of a sentence’s semantic content no longer work. Direct 
speech compounds need not use figurative language. Thus, in (3b), all the 
words in the compound (“touch”, “nose”, “stand”, “one”, “foot”, “drunk”) 
mean exactly what the dictionary says they mean. Crucially, it is also 
impossible to account for the examples in (3) as implicatures. The criterion 
for identifying an implicature is cancellability. (3d) is particularly instructive 
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in this sense. Consider: “Tomorrow is make-your-kids-into-greedy-little-
materialistic-consumption-addicts day, and I don’t mean Christmas”. 
Originally, (2d) referred to Christmas day, but this reference can be denied. 
This is a typical case of “cancelling” an implicature. But what is the “literal” 
meaning to which our understanding of this sentence reverts after 
cancellation? We’d still expect the utterer to have referred to a day (and 
behaviors taking place on it) characterized by greed, addictive consumption, 
etc. What is cancelled is the reference to a specific holiday, but not the 
meaning of the reported speech compound.3 
What I hope to have shown in this brief discussion is that it is 
impossible to build a wall separating semantics from pragmatics, linguistic 
meaning from the way people act, think, and understand each other. 
2. The monological approach to language 
[M]eaning is, in the last analysis, a matter of 
conceptualization (what else could it possibly be?) 
(Langacker 1987, p. 156) 
                                                 
3 Note also that direct speech compounds do no function (semantically) as 
simple reported speech. Thus, (3c) does not attribute the uttering of the words “if 
only I had this or that then I’d be happy” to anyone. It is also not a self-referential 





A monological approach to language seeks explanations for linguistic 
phenomena in the individual human mind. If logical approaches to language 
have to peg meaning to objects in the world and their properties, monological 
views are free to recognize the dynamic and contextual nature of meaning, 
reflecting the dynamic and contextual nature of human perception and 
cognition. 
Historically, monological approaches to language, in their purest 
form, flourished in 19th- and early 20th-century German linguistics (see 
Voloshinov 1986, pp. 48–52, 83–98 for a critical overview). In this original 
form, monologism was typically aligned with idealist trends in philosophy: 
meaning, grammatical phenomena, and especially linguistic change, were 
accounted for as instantiations of the internal development processes of the 
collective national, or even universal (Absolute) mind or spirit (see, e.g., 
Vossler 1932). More recently, a new version of monologism has emerged 
within Cognitive Linguistics. This new monologism focuses on the cognitive 
capacities of the individual human mind, particularly on conceptualization, to 
account for linguistic meaning and linguistic phenomena (an emphasis 
reflected in the motto I used for this section). Typically monological themes 
in Cognitive Linguistics include, among others, work on metaphor (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980) and conceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) 
as features of human cognition that shape language, the introduction of radial 
categories with their prototype-periphery structure into linguistics 
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(Langacker, 1987), following work on prototypes in cognitive psychology 
(Rosch 1973), and the notion of fictivity (Talmy 2000), linked to our 
cognitive capacity of imagination. 
Cognitive Linguistics as such, however, is not reducible to 
monologism alone. Instead, Cognitive-Linguistic theories typically combine 
monological and dialogical principles and motivations. Thus, a clear 
commitment to a usage-based account of meaning and of grammatical form 
(Langacker 1987; Croft 2001) is a core dialogical element of Cognitive 
Linguistics. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend toward 
dialogism and intersubjectivity in the field (e.g., Croft 2009; Dancygier and 
Sweetser 2012; Du Bois, 2014; Oakley and Hougaard, 2008; Verhagen, 
2005)—a trend which the literature on fictive interaction is very much part 
of. In this context, it is also important to frame my argument in the present 
chapter correctly, not as an argument against Cognitive Linguistics, but rather 
as an argument internal to it, an argument for a more consistently dialogical 
approach within Cognitive Linguistics. 
From a dialogical perspective, a critique of monological approaches 
differs both in its aims and in its methods from a critique of logical ones. 
Logical theories of language and meaning are, on a dialogical view, 
fundamentally wrong about how language works. A dialogical critique of 
such theories would seek to refute them. By contrast, a dialogical critique of 
monological theories does not come in the form of a refutation. After all, 
dialogue occurs between individuals, so a proper account of what goes on in 
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a single person’s mind when speaking and communicating is part and parcel 
of any correct description of dialogue. Hence, the qualm dialogism has with 
consistently monological accounts of language is not that they are wrong, but 
that they are incomplete. Monological accounts of linguistic phenomena are 
compatible with dialogical accounts (e.g., there is nothing about metaphor, or 
about the prototype-periphery structure of categories, not to mention fictivity, 
that would not fit comfortably into a dialogical account of language), but with 
many phenomena, including most forms of fictive interaction, it is only the 
dialogical position that can account for the motivation behind the linguistic 
phenomenon itself. When our picture of language involves one mind facing 
the world around it, we may be able to offer a good explanation for what is 
going on in fictive interaction, but not an account for why would one use it. 
Fictive interaction, as I shall argue, would be gratuitous in a linguistic world 
designed for a single mind, unless this mind is itself already dialogic, already 
shaped from within by interaction with other minds. 
As a first illustration, consider the sentences in (4): 
 
(4) a. Something tells me I’m into something good. 
b. I’m not myself today (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 283). 
 
Apart from being the title of the Herman’s Hermits oldie, (4a) is one 
of many examples (Pang 2005; Pascual 2014 pp. 91–98) of fictive interaction 
used to express the thoughts or feelings of an individual by conceptually 
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splitting that individual into two or more speakers (in this case, “something” 
is a speaker that addresses “me”). Now, splitting of the self has been dealt 
with extensively in cognitive linguistics. There is the detailed study of 
conceptual metaphors involved in such expressions by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999, pp. 267–289) and there is the even earlier treatment of the subject as 
part of Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1994; Lakoff and Sweetser 1994, 
pp. ix–x). These studies and others provide an account for the meaning of 
such expressions as (4b), which pose a severe challenge to logical approaches 
(note the contradiction that emerges if we assign the deictics “I” and “today” 
their standard functions, as done by Kaplan 1989). 
But then there is also the question of motivation, of why do people 
use such expressions as in (4). And I don’t mean local pragmatic and 
conversational reasons, as important as these are. “Something tells me” is a 
commonly used turn of phrase that people find fitting, eloquent, functional, 
accurate, in a variety of situations. How come? Why do such expressions 
serve our local purposes successfully? Viewed from this angle, (4a) and (4b) 
differ substantially. By uttering (4b), the speaker compresses a multiplicity of 
behaviors and attitudes she has exhibited in a wide variety of situations, at 
different places and times, into one compact image (a self, as distinct from 
the subject, in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) terms), and then goes on to 
contrast her behavior today with this identity. This fits well into a 
monological account, where a conceptualizer uses a single image to mentally 
access a complex distribution of diverse phenomena. In their discussion of 
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“constitutive and governing principles” for conceptual integration, 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002, pp. 309–352) provide exactly this sort of 
monological rationale. Of particular interest is one important principle (or 
“noteworthy subgoal”) they list: “Go from Many to One” (p. 323). Indeed, in 
(4b), the speaker goes from many behaviors and attitudes to one self. 
However, this is not the case in (4a). Consider a possible paraphrase: 
“I expect something good to happen to me”. Compared with this paraphrase, 
(4a) does not seem to help us grasp anything that should be particularly 
difficult for the speaker’s mind to access. Quite to the contrary (and this is 
typical of the fictive-interaction kind of self-splitting), what (4a) expresses is 
the speaker’s current state of mind, to which she (presumably) has direct 
mental access. Nevertheless, this state of mind is conceptualized and 
presented in (4a) as a (fictive) conversation with two participants.4 
Faced with a different, but in some ways similar challenge to their 
theory posed by examples of fictive motion, Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 
pp. 378–379) write: 
 
                                                 
4 The paraphrase I used is not entirely accurate: “something tells me” reflects 
less certainty than “I expect”, differs slightly in its evidential status. But this is, again, 
very typical. Fictive interaction allows one to mentally access and to express subtle 
shades of one’s own emotion and attitude that our standard vocabulary of terms for 
inner states does not fully cover. This further underlines the dialogical nature of 
people’s subjective experience. 
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Human action […] is a basic human-scale structure. […] The blended space, 
with action, event, and state, is more complex from a formal point of view 
than the input with just a state, but the added complexity crucially enhances 
the human-scale quality of the scene. It is more congenial for human beings 
to process a full, dynamic, intentional human-scale action than it is to 
process one apparently simple component of it. 
 
Now, replace the word “action” in this quote with “interaction”—and 
the resulting concession would provide a good account of the fictive-
interaction type of splitting the self, supplementing the subgoal “go from 
many to one” with the new subgoal, “go from one to two”. But then, accepting 
that interaction is essential to what human scale is, that human cognition can 
access a dialogue between several agents better than a solitary inner state, 
amounts to replacing a monological theory with a dialogical one. 
To further explore some of the issues at stake, consider another quote 
from the same book: 
 
(5) [B]uilding a rich emergent structure out of a tenuous connection 
between inputs is a deep principle of science. The connection 
between an apple and the moon seems at first blush to be only the 
most tenuous analogy of shape and some motion, but in the blend of 
Newtonian physics, the apple and the moon are the same and 
exemplify the laws of the universe. Similarly, the psychoanalyst 
searches for seemingly “accidental” identities and analogies running 
across childhood experience, dreams, and adult behavior (“You say 
you always wear red shoes to the circus. What was the color of your 
hat, did you say, when you visited your grandmother on her 
deathbed? You said the circus was a ‘celebration of life’. Of course, 
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you mean ‘of death’”) (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, pp. 136–137, 
italics added). 
 
The italicized words are an example of fictive interaction. Like the 
other examples I will present below, it is also an instance of what Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1984, pp. 181–210) called “double-voiced discourse”—an utterance 
in which we can hear two different voices, two different subjects’ positions, 
expressed simultaneously in the very same words (by definition, double-
voiced discourse always involves fictive interaction). This example exhibits 
three starkly dialogical features that I would like to focus on here: 
1. The psychoanalyst’s voice is relevant in the context of a discussion of the 
discipline, not the person. A space is available for this character to speak in. 
2. The psychoanalyst’s voice becomes the object of evaluation by the authors, 
of dialogical stance (Du Bois 2007) toward it. 
3. The psychoanalyst’s voice is not merely described or represented, but is 
dramatically enacted by the authors. 
All three features can be illustrated if we compare the actual quote 
above with an alternative formulation (a substitute for the italicized 
parenthetical remark) that was not used: 
 
(6) […] For instance, the psychoanalyst may link between the fact that 
a patient reports always wearing red shoes to the circus and the color 
of that patient’s hat when he visited his grandmother on her 
deathbed and interpret the patient’s statement that the circus is “a 
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celebration of life” as reflecting a connection, in his psyche, 
between the circus and death. 
 
Let us begin with the first feature. The fact that the psychoanalyst—a 
person—shows up, rather than psychoanalysis as a discipline in the context 
of Fauconnier and Turner’s discussion there is notable, but we can give this 
fact a purely monological account by analyzing this as a case of metonymy. 
However, the psychoanalyst also begins to speak. 
In terms of conceptualization, (5) and (6) give the reader essentially 
the same information. Indeed, if anything, (6) offers a clearer and more 
explicit (though perhaps slightly less compact) statement of how 
psychoanalysis exemplifies the principle Fauconnier and Turner (2002) are 
discussing. Fictively “quoting” the psychoanalyst appears unmotivated. And 
yet, I think any reasonable reader would agree the use of fictive interaction in 
(5) is a much livelier choice of wording than the dull paraphrase in (6). If 
meaning is a matter of (monological) conceptualization, both original and 
paraphrase should be equivalent in what they mean, and yet there is a 
noticeable difference between (5) and (6) that the use of fictive interaction 
seems to introduce. 
One such difference is that the psychoanalyst in (5) is not merely 
quoted; she is ridiculed. This ridicule is not conveyed in (6), even though we 
are given the same information about the psychoanalyst’s reasoning that 
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makes it sound ridiculous in (5).5 This ridicule is an important (if secondary) 
aspect of what the text in (5) means. Note also that such ridicule is not an 
external pragmatic add-on to the conceptual structure. Consider another 
example of fictive interaction from the same book (Fauconnier and Turner 
2002, p. 175 italics added): 
 
(7) As Darwin noted, evolution’s main trick seems to be gradual 
change, so an adaptationist account is obliged to show that each step 
would have been adaptive. Evolution is never allowed to think 
“Well, if I could get to stage ten, it would be good, so give me a 
break while I go through the first nine”. 
 
Here, the same type of ridicule we saw directed at the psychoanalyst 
is directed at evolution (or, indirectly, at an adversary’s views about 
evolution), only now the ridicule itself is “embedded” in the conceptual 
structure (in a counterfactual space). 
What the use of fictive interaction enables here is the reading of the 
psychoanalyst’s (or evolution’s) words as parody. In parody, we must have 
                                                 
5 Of course, I am not saying the use of fictive interaction is a condition—
either necessary or sufficient—for conveying ridicule. In this instance, one important 
reason that (6) does not convey ridicule is that the context (exemplifying “a deep 
principle in science”, with Newtonian physics as another case in point) actively 
discourages such a reading. A different context may have enabled ridicule to pass 
through. But then, the same context is not enough to block the reading of the fictive 
interaction sequence in (5) as a parody. 
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the psychoanalyst’s voice heard, so that it can be the vehicle for the authors’ 
parodying ridicule. Conversely, once a voice is heard, the authors’ stance 
toward this voice and the speaker to whom it belongs becomes relevant to the 
interpretation of the passage. 
As noted above, the example in (5)—and parody in general—belongs 
to the class of phenomena Bakhtin (1984, pp. 181–210) called “double-voiced 
discourse”. In Bakhtin’s analysis, double-voice discourse involves a dialogic 
relation between author and character. So, in our case, we have not only the 
represented dialogue between psychoanalyst and patient and the framing 
dialogue between Fauconnier and Turner and their readers, but also a dialogue 
between Fauconnier and Turner and the psychoanalyst. The ridicule we hear 
directed toward at least some psychoanalytic practices in the analyzed quote 
belongs to this latter level of dialogue. 
But let us come back to the third dialogical feature of the 
psychoanalyst example: its performative or dramatic aspect. The paraphrase 
in (6) speaks about the psychoanalyst, but in (5) Fauconnier and Turner 
actually impersonate the psychoanalyst, assume her role (this is, in a sense, 
the speaker-perspective side of a point already made above). To give you an 
impression of some of the complexity dramatic role-play can exhibit in even 
quite mundane situations, consider the conversation transcript in (8):6 
                                                 
6 The original conversation was recorded by the author and conducted in 




(8) 1 S: Can we help with anything? 
 2 R: No but it’s time to sit down cause the food is 
getting cold it’s a cold day today. 
 3 S: ↓Oy [(h)(h)(h) [if we don’t eat up we won’t 
grow up? 
 4 R:     [the       [the good thing is that 
 5  (0.5) 
 6 R: Exactly. (.) the good thing is that I’m 
sitting alone. 
 
A few words on what is going on in this conversation. First of all, R 
is the host of a small family gathering. Her guests are her two adult children 
(both in another room when this conversation takes place), and her son-in-
law (S). As the conversation begins, R is about to finish arranging the dishes 
on the dinner table for the meal. 
On one level, what we see in (8) is S politely asking whether he could 
help R in serving the meal and R telling him to go get the other diners to come 
to the table instead. But there’s also another level. To understand what’s going 
on at that other level, I need to say a few words about a cultural stereotype 
that plays an important role in this conversation. English speakers might be 
                                                 
sufficient for present purposes). See Sandler (2009) for a detailed analysis of the 
original. Transcription symbols used follow Jefferson (2004). 
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familiar with this stereotype under the label “Jewish Mother”.7 The Jewish 
Mother is an overweening parent, who gets her children (typically adults, or 
at least adolescents) to do what she wants by means of constant guilt-tripping 
wrapped in bitter irony. The Jewish Mother comes with a repertoire of 
utterances and behaviors, and a good amount of folklore (jokes, stories). This 
repertoire is on display in the conversation we are looking at: “The food is 
getting cold”, “If you don’t eat up you won’t grow up”, and, perhaps the most 
famous one (among Hebrew speakers): “[leave me] sitting alone in the dark” 
are all stereotypical Jewish-Mother utterances that are either repeated or 
alluded to here. 
What we see in this conversation then is R adding a touch of humor 
to her request of S in line 2 by uttering it in the Jewish Mother’s voice. In line 
3, S actually profiles the dramatic aspect of R’s previous turn by joining the 
role-play (as the Jewish Mother’s ill-fated child). In terms of conceptual 
content, both the fictive and the factive readings of R’s utterance point to it 
being a request to call everyone else to the dinner table, but S nevertheless 
responds to the dramatic aspect of R’s words as such. Note also the rising 
intonation contour at the end of line 3. In this instance, it marks the utterance 
as a guess. S is guessing the Jewish Mother role-play is on purpose, but asks 
                                                 
7 Hebrew speakers would refer to it as the “Polish Mother”, with a middle-
aged Ashkenazi-Jewish woman as a prototype in both cases. R—it should be noted—
fits the stereotype in terms of ethnic identity and age. 
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for confirmation (and does so, again, by joining in the role-play, not by 
making an explicit query). R’s eventual response in line 6 starts with giving 
the confirmation asked for (“Exactly”), followed by what is essentially a 
repeat of the request in line 2. But this is again done in the Jewish Mother’s 
voice (“The good thing is that I’m sitting alone”—”sitting alone” here 
simultaneously refers to the predicted undesirable situation of R, the host, 
sitting alone at the dinner table while her guests are busy doing other things, 
and alludes to the Jewish Mother sitting alone in the dark, offended by her 
uncaring and ungrateful children). Following this, S (or is it the scolded, guilt-
tripped child of the Jewish Mother?) goes to the other room to call the other 
guests to dinner. 
At no point during the entire exchange does either participant step out 
of character. Fictively impersonating the Jewish Mother and her child is 
seamlessly woven into the more practical exchange about calling guests to 
the dinner table. Fictive utterances that are part of the role-play are used to 
successfully accomplish (speech) acts that are part of the practical exchange. 
Now, Blending Theory can and does provide an account of situations 
in which people act out roles, as in, among others, the brief discussion of 
dramatic blends (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, pp. 266–267), of “living in the 
blend” (pp. 83–84), and of a variety of rituals (e.g., pp. 85–86). There is, 
however, a subtle but crucial issue to take into account here. It has to do with 
the distinction between the actor’s and analyst’s (and observer’s) different 
points of view. In the cases Fauconnier and Turner discuss, the significance 
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of this distinction is somewhat masked by the fact that the conceptual 
integration network is given to the actors in advance. The Jewish Mother 
example, however, can help put the issue at stake in sharper relief. 
Blending Theory provides an insightful account of what is going on 
in (8) from the analyst’s perspective: R and S and the situation in which they 
interact are blended with the stereotypical Jewish Mother and child scenario. 
If we apply Blending Theory here for such analytical or descriptive purposes, 
it does its job perfectly well. The problem arises if we try to go one 
(monological) step further, and claim blending to be the cognitive operation 
that underlies the observed role-play, that is, to use blending to reduce 
dialogue to individual cognition (this appears to be the project pursued by 
Pagán-Canóvas and Turner, this volume). In this case, the analyst’s 
perspective is no longer enough, and we would need to claim the role play R 
and S engage in instantiates a blending operation from their own, actors’, 
perspective. This, in turn, would mean the current communicative ground 
serves as an input in the blending operation going on in the minds of its 
participants (again, see Pagán-Canóvas and Turner, this volume, who make 
this claim explicitly about most cases of fictive interaction, or “fictive 
communication”, to use their own term). 
However, for the current communicative ground to be available to me 
as an input, I need to stand in a position in space and time that is external to 
that ground. As Bakhtin (1990) emphasized long ago, this is strictly 
impossible. I do have a perspective on the ongoing interaction, which is 
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available to me as an input, but this perspective does not include my own 
active position. The only way I can gain mental access to my current role in 
the communicative ground is through its reflection in my interlocutor’s 
responses to my utterances. R and S, in our transcript, cannot jump out of 
their skins and perceive their performance. They also cannot tell how the 
conversation will be unfolding in advance. In line 2, R does not yet know 
what S’s answer to her turn of talk is going to be (see Oakley and Hougaard 
2008, and especially Cienki 2008, for a discussion of closely related issues). 
In line 2, as yet, there is nothing that can be blended with the interaction 
between Jewish Mother and child, which would be available to R and S as an 
input. Rather, this input is in the process of being created by R and S, and an 
impromptu enactment of the Jewish Mother and her child is being created. In 
short, it is not the blending that produces the role play here, but the role play 
that produces the blending, not in the solitude of an individual mind, but 
through on-line negotiation in dialogue between two. 
As I hope the discussion here has shown, intersubjectivity in the way 
people speak and think, as instantiated by the many forms of fictive 
interaction, cannot be fully reduced to the terms of individual cognition (let 
alone to abstract logical notions), unless we acknowledge individual 
cognition itself is in many important respects already dialogical. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I would like to outline some of the consequences 
of approaching meaning from the dialogical side, that is, of taking dialogue 
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and intersubjectivity as the starting point for an account of meaning in 
language. 
3. The dialogical approach to language 
By meanings I understand answers to questions. 
That which answers no question is meaningless to 
us […] Meaning is potentially infinite, but it may 
only be actualized when it comes into contact with 
other meaning. 
(Bakhtin 1986, pp. 145–146, translation modified) 
 
A dialogical approach to language sees interaction as an essential aspect of 
language and meaning on all levels of description. On a dialogical account, 
the conversation frame is not merely a frame; it is the Mother Frame. That is, 
we always assume by default that there is (fictive) interaction between voices 
going on in anything people utter. Sometimes this level of analysis can be 
reduced to a simplified scenario, in which a speaker uses her authorial voice 
throughout but this is a special case. As a matter of course, we always ask 
ourselves at any point, “Who’s talking?”; we always expect voices to appear, 
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explicitly or implicitly. Like Bakhtin (1986, p. 169), we “hear voices in 
everything and dialogic relations among them”.8 
The Bakhtin quote in the motto to this section offers what is in effect 
the overarching semantic principle of a dialogical account of language: the 
meaning of an utterance is reflected in how it is responded to. This principle 
has been independently applied by Harvey Sacks (1992) in Conversation 
Analysis: to understand what kind of an action a turn in conversation 
performs, what it is, what it means, we need to look at the turn or turns that 
respond to it (cf. Bilmes 1985). 
But fictive interaction allows us to extend this principle, as Bakhtin 
indeed intended it to be, from the relation between utterances9 to the internal 
dialogue going on within utterances (thus, the meaning of the psychoanalyst’s 
fictive utterance in (5) is only understood if we recognize the evaluation with 
which the authors respond to it). In this sense, dialogism offers a homogenous 
approach to language: the same principles that are in play when interpreting 
                                                 
8 A related fact is that, on this level, human interaction takes place in a 
thoroughly personified, speaking, world, in which things, ideas, emotions, 
organizations, etc. can always acquire voice and agency (Cooren 2010; Cooren and 
Sandler 2014). 
9 I am using here the term “utterance” in Bakhtin’s (1986, pp. 60–102) 
sense—a discursive whole delimited by the change of speaking subject. An utterance 
in this sense can be anything from the briefest turn in a conversation to a multi-
volume novel or treatise, but it is a single “work”. 
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the utterance in the context of the interaction it is part of are also in play when 
interpreting its internal (grammatical, conceptual, etc.) structure. 
On a dialogical account of language, voices and interaction between 
them are everywhere. It’s intersubjectivity all the way down. Words, phrases, 
prosodic markers, the very texture of language, are all imbued with voices. 
Thus, “the food is getting cold” is a phrase that carries the Jewish Mother’s 
voice—among others—with it. It is only through these voices and our 
responding manipulation of them do they become meaningful (Bakhtin, 1981; 
Gasparov, 2010).  
As I noted at the very outset, the conversation frame is a frame of 
intersubjectivity. Since in fictive interaction language and cognition are 
structured by the conversation frame, a dialogical account of such examples 
as I used in this paper is straightforward. The challenge for the dialogical 
approach to meaning is to show how the principles and ideas I briefly outlined 
here can apply more generally, even when the dialogue of voices in an 
utterance is not easily apparent. Several recent works have achieved 
substantial progress along this path. I should particularly note Verhagen’s 
(2005) analysis of such ubiquitous constructions as (sentential) negation in 
explicitly intersubjective terms and Gasparov’s (2010) theory of linguistic 
texture. Other significant contributions toward a dialogical theory of language 
and meaning include—among others—such programmatic works as Wold 
(1992), Linell (1998), Ducrot (1984), and (within Cognitive Linguistics 
proper) Croft (2009), Du Bois’ (2014) work on resonance and implications 
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drawn from it for grammar (Brône and Zima 2014), and, of course, Pascual’s 
(2002, 2006, 2014) work on fictive interaction and the research program it 
has generated (as represented in this volume). To this, one should add studies 
focusing on the central role of intersubjectivity in human cognition, such as 
Zlatev et al. (2008).10 
All this progress notwithstanding, elaborating a full dialogical theory 
of meaning is still a task that lies ahead. This is not a task for a single paper, 
or for a single author’s efforts, so I will stop here for now. But I do hope what 
I said so far makes a good case for developing such a dialogical approach 
further, and for the central place the study of the rich and diverse forms of 
fictive interaction has in such an endeavor. 
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